This book locates US elites as members of corporate elite networks and drivers of corporate elite interests, arguing that studying the social sources of US power plays an important part in understanding the nature of their decisions in US foreign policy. Exploring the decisions taken by American elites on the Iraq War, the author argues that the decisions and agendas US elites pursued in Iraq were driven by corporate elite interests – embedded in them as individuals and in groups through the corporate elite networks they were rooted in – which they prioritised, using democracy promotion as a cover up. Using elite theory, membership network analysis and content analysis, this book explains who these elites were, how their backgrounds and social influences impacted their world-views, and what this looked like in a detailed exploration of their decision-making on the ground in Iraq. Nouri examines the nature of US power, what drives it, what it looks like and its legacies. This volume provides valuable understandings and lessons to scholars and students of International Relations studying democracy, US foreign policy, post-colonialism, elite theory, US imperialism, neoliberalism, orientalism, Iraqi politics, and the making of the Iraq constitution.

The attacks of 9/11 led to a war on Iraq, although there was neither tangible evidence that the nation's leader, Saddam Hussein, was linked to Osama bin Laden nor proof of weapons of mass destruction. Why, then, did the Iraq war garner so much acceptance in the United States during its primary stages? Mass Deception argues that the George W. Bush administration manufactured public support for the war on Iraq. Scott A. Bonn introduces a unique, integrated, and interdisciplinary theory called "critical communication" to explain how and why political elites and the news media periodically create public panics that benefit both parties. Using quantitative analysis of public opinion polls and presidential rhetoric pre- and post-9/11 in the news media, Bonn applies the moral panic concept to the Iraq war. He critiques the war and occupation of Iraq as violations of domestic and international law. Finally, Mass Deception connects propaganda and distortion efforts by the Bush administration to more general theories of elite deviance and state crime.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.

Iraq recovered its full sovereignty at the end of 2011, with the departure of all US military forces. The 2003 invasion was undertaken to dismantle a regime that had long threatened its own population and regional peace, as well as to establish a stable, democratic state in the heart of the Middle East. This Adelphi looks at the legacy of that intervention and subsequent state-building efforts. It analyses the evolution of the insurgency, the descent into full-scale civil war and the implementation of the surge as a counterinsurgency strategy. It goes on to examine US and Iraqi efforts to reconstruct the states military and civilian capacity. By developing a clear understanding of the current situation in Iraq, this book seeks to answer three questions that are central to the countrys future. Will it continue to suffer high levels of violence or even slide back into a vicious civil war? Will Iraq continue on a democratic path, as exemplified by the three competitive national elections held since 2005? And does the new Iraq pose a threat to its neighbours?

From the world's foremost intellectual activist, an irrefutable analysis of America's pursuit of total domination and the catastrophic consequences that are sure to follow The United States is in the process of staking out not just the globe but the last unarmed spot in our neighborhood-the heavens-as a militarized sphere of influence. Our earth and its skies are, for the Bush administration, the final frontiers of imperial control. In Hegemony or Survival , Noam Chomsky investigates how we came to this moment, what kind of peril we find ourselves in, and why our rulers are willing to jeopardize the future of our species. With the striking logic that is his trademark, Chomsky dissects America's quest for global supremacy, tracking the U.S. government's aggressive pursuit of policies intended to achieve "full spectrum dominance" at any cost. He lays out vividly how the various strands of policy-the militarization of space, the ballistic-missile defense program, unilateralism, the dismantling of international agreements, and the response to the Iraqi crisis-cohere in a drive for hegemony that ultimately threatens our survival. In our era, he argues, empire is a recipe for an earthly wasteland. Lucid, rigorous, and thoroughly documented, Hegemony or Survival promises to be Chomsky's most urgent and sweeping work in years, certain to spark widespread debate.

Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.

While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?