This collection of 51 essays provides a history of amphibious landings that include European, Asian, and American operations. It describes in detail some of history's most significant amphibious assaults, as well as planned attacks that were never carried out.

Conventional military wisdom holds that the amphibious assault against a defended beach is the most difficult of all military operations--yet modern amphibious landings have been almost universally successful. This apparent contradiction is fully explored in this first look at 20th-century amphibious warfare from the perspective of the defender. The author, Col. Theodore L. Gatchel, USMC (Ret.), examines amphibious operations from Gallipoli to the Falkland Islands to determine why the defenders were unable to prevent the attackers from landing or to throw them back into the sea after they had fought their way ashore. He places the reader in the defenders' shoes as such epic battles as Normandy, Iwo Jima, and Inchon are planned and fought, and then uses these cases to explain why the defenders were unable to successfully defend against enemy landings. A practitioner, teacher, and student of amphibious warfare, Colonel Gatchel follows those explanations with speculations on how a defender today might try to stop a landing and on the implications of such actions for future amphibious operations.

Leading international military and academic experts analyse 37 amphibious operations from the 'how not to do it' catastrophe of Gallipoli in 1915, through the Second World War, Vietnam and the Falklands, to the Al Faw landings in Iraq in 2003. German, Japanese and Soviet operations are included.

Nimble Books has published several public domain reprints of books on mine warfare that have sold surprisingly well over the years, probably because mine warfare is an effective mode of combat that has been persistently under-resourced and under-studied by Big Navy. In recent years the Navy and the Marine Corps seem to have abandoned the idea of ever risking a large-scale amphibious assault opposed by precision-guided missiles, but that does not mean mine warfare is no longer relevant to the expeditionary community. The new Navy/Marine doctrines for war in the Pacific still envisage many troop-bearing transits through contested and quite possibly mined waters, and the ""pacing threat"" of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would almost certainly involve a large amphibious assault where US mines might play an important role. This document is a thesis that examines the effects of sea mining on amphibious warfare. It includes case studies of amphibious assaults conducted at Gallipoli, Normandy, Wonsan, and the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm. The study analyzes the forces involved, the mining conducted, and the impact of mining and mine countermeasures on the achievement of surprise in the assault. The study concludes that force levels are crucial for the success of amphibious assaults, with adequate force levels leading to successful operations. It also emphasizes the importance of rapid and complete mine countermeasures to achieve surprise in amphibious assaults. The document provides historical context, discusses the strategic and operational considerations of amphibious warfare, and highlights the significance of mine warfare in amphibious operations. This annotated edition illustrates the capabilities of the AI Lab for Book-Lovers to add context and ease-of-use to manuscripts. It includes five types of abstracts, building from simplest to more complex: TLDR (one word), ELI5, TLDR (vanilla), Scientific Style, and Action Items; three essays to increase viewpoint diversity: Grounds for Dissent, Red Team Critique, and MAGA Perspective; and Notable Passages and Nutshell Summaries for each page.

FROM our entry into the war at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 until the Japanese surrender in September 1945, every major offensive campaign launched by the United States was initiated by an amphibious assault. Our landings at North Africa in November 1942, at Sicily and Italy in July and September 1943, and at Normandy and Southern France in June and September 1944 ended in the defeat of the German armies in Western Europe by the Allied Expeditionary Force in May 1945. The Pacific offensive, which began in the South Pacific with the landings at the Solomons in August 1942 and in the Central Pacific at the Gilberts in November 1943, carried us 3,000 miles to the Philippine Islands and 5,000 miles through to the inner defenses of the empire in the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands....Amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in our conduct of global war. The tactics and techniques of our landing operations represent a new and significant development in the art of war. Although military history contains many instances of landing operations conducted by both military and navy forces in all parts of the world, from the early time man first crossed the sea to wage war, the landings were generally either limited in scope and purpose or unopposed. The feasibility of amphibious raids, in which assault forces landed from the sea are withdrawn after limited operations, and of unopposed landings, relying on surprise and conducted for the purpose of subsequent military operations ashore, has long been recognized. Until the recent war, however, the effect of modern defensive weapons was considered too decisive to permit successful assault from the sea. The development of radar, aviation, coast defense guns, torpedoes, submarines, mines, defensive obstructions and obstacles, automatic weapons, highly mobile reserves, and the necessary communication facilities to coordinate and control them seemed to present insurmountable difficulties to amphibious attack.

This volume reconceptualizes amphibious warfare and also fills an important gap in its historiography, examining how it was conceived, practised and employed, from the Crusades, through the first wave of European exploration and colonization, the Price Revolution and the European wars of religion, up to the early Industrial Revolution and the beginnings of a new wave of imperialism. Essays examine issues related to strategy, operational art, tactics, logistics and military technology, but also consider commerce and culture. They reveal that amphibious warfare was often waged for economic reasons and was the quintessential warfare of European imperialism, for sea power was required to deliver and sustain land power. The volume is lavishly illustrated with 30 plates and twelve maps. Contributors: Matthew Bennett; Louis Sicking; Malyn Newitt; Jan Glete; John F. Guilmartin; R. B. Wernham; Mark Charles Fissel; Guy Rowlands; John Stapleton; David J.B. Trim.

Demonstrates how the Navy's veteran leadership, flexible organization, versatile ships and aircraft, and great mobility gave General of the Army, Douglas A. MacArthur, the ability to launch a catastrophic offensive against the North Korean invaders of South Korea. Chapters: North Korean invasion and UN reaction; preparing for Operation Chromite; the "Blackbeard of Yonghung Do"; "Ten Enemy Vessels Approaching"; "Land the Landing Force"; storming ashore at red beach; Baldomero Lopez, a U.S. Marine; the vital LST; taking the initiative at Blue Beach; a night in Inchon; objective: Seoul; and over-the-beach logistics. Action photos and paintings in color and B&W.